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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880612-CA
Priority No. 2

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Text of Statutes and
Constitutional Provisions, Statement of the Case, and Statement of
the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at v, 1-4.
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's argument
in Points I and II of its brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Christofferson's fifth amendment right to counsel was
violated when he stated that counsel already had been appointed to
him and no clarification of his comment was sought.

There is no

evidence of a clear intent to waive this right and the reading of
Miranda warnings by themselves cannot establish clarification or
waiver.
Mr. Christofferson did not waive his right to remedy of a
discovery violation since there was an objection raised before the
court and relief sought.

Even though there was other evidence of

guilt, the discovery violation created substantial taint on the jury
deliberation process requiring reversal of his conviction.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. MR, CHRISTOFFERSONS1 FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED,
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
A. TWO STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY TO THE
DISCUSSION UNDER POINT I OF APPELLANTfS OPENING
BRIEF.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IA)
It is true, as the State asserts in its brief at page 10,
that factual determinations made by the trial court are reviewed
under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).

See State v. Walker, 743

However, if clear error is found and

that error infringes upon a federal constitutional right, then a
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis must be applied to the
case.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967); State v.

Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

A violation of the

accused's Miranda rights and fifth amendment right to counsel
demands that the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard
be applied.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986).

That

standard is more fully set out on page 20 of Mr. Christofferson's
Opening Brief.

The State has the burden of proof in this matter.

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
[T]he beneficiary of a constitutional error [must]
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.
Id.
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B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR WITH
RESPECT TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS CONCERNING THE
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IB)
Respondent takes issue with two statements in
Mr. Christoffersons's Opening Brief.
by the trial court.

Both go to erroneous rulings

First, the State takes issue with Appellant's

statement that a transportation officer "would have taken the
defendant to court the day after his arrest" (Br. of App. at 11).
The State points out that there is no evidence that Officer Probert
specifically took the Defendant to court (Br. of Res. at 11). While
there is no evidence that Officer Probert ever came in contact with
Mr. Christofferson, Officer Probert's testimony establishes that,
according to normal procedure, the day after his arrest
Mr. Christofferson would most likely have been taken before a
magistrate for a probable cause hearing (R. 122 at 20).
Therefore, the judge's ruling that a probable cause
hearing could not possibly have been held is clearly erroneous
(R. 35).
The State also takes issue with Appellant's statement
that the officers involved "had the impression Mr. Christofferson
appeared in court and a lawyer was appointed" (Br. of App. at 11).
It is true that only one officer testified that he thought
Mr. Christofferson believed he had been appointed an attorney
(R. 122 at 4-5 & 14). While the officer may not actually have
believed or had the impression that an attorney had been appointed,
he was aware that the Defendant had the impression that he had an
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attorney.

Most importantly, the officer was put on notice that

there might have been a previous invocation of rights by
Mr. Christofferson.

The officer took no steps to investigate the

potentially problematic assertion of the Defendant.

Therefore,

there is no evidence directly contradicting Mr. Christofferson1s
assertion.

His statement before being questioned by the police is

some evidence that he invoked his right to counsel at the probable
cause hearing.

C. THE STATE HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN IN SHOWING
THAT MR. CHRISTOFFERSON WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IC)
Respondent contends that the record shows that
Mr. Christofferson made his arguably equivocal request for counsel
before the Miranda warnings were given and that the Miranda warnings
themselves acted as appropriate clarification of his equivocal
request.
The warnings themselves are a stronger
clarification than if the detectives had asked
what he meant.
(Br. of Res. at 17). The State makes this assertion without citing
any case law.
The State's position misses the differences between the
solution to the problem as announced in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and the solution offered by the clarification approach.
Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), create a "rigid
prophylactic rule" to protect an accused's right to counsel to

. 4
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protect against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984).

The problem is one of

psychological coercion by the police in such a situation and the
solution is to create a hard and fast rule:

warnings must be given

and if the right is in any way invoked, interrogation must cease.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
invariable.

This protection is inflexible and

Such a system is bound to create problems, and one of

the obvious ones is the problem recognized but not decided in
Smith.

What happens if an interrogating officer cannot tell, if the

right has been invoked?
problem.

Smith notes three solutions to the

Id. at 96 n.3.

Miranda itself:

The two extremes are equally as rigid as

either any reference to an attorney blocks

interrogation or only those references passing some threshold of
clarify block interrogation.
The third Smith possibility adopted by this Court in
State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988), is the
clarification approach.
approach.

Id. at 969.

This is a pragmatic rather than rigid
If an equivocal request is made, the officer

tries to clarify the nature of the request.

The nature of the

clarification must vary with the situation.

This is as different

from the use of the rigid Miranda warnings as a procedure can be.
Criminal defendants are not often sophisticated or
articulate.

The clarificiation approach takes into account that

lack of sophistication and ability to clearly communicate, just as
Miranda seeks to protect rights of the accused as simply as
possible.

To have an accused in custody make any statement
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concerning counsel must at least temporarily be viewed as an
invocation of rights.

Appropriate ad hoc clarification can

adequately determine the accused's state of mind.
However, when such a person makes a self-assertive
statment concerning counsel and the response is a blank stare,
refusing to pay attention to the remark or the opaque reciting of
the Miranda warnings, clarification has not occurred.

While most

people would be dumbfounded by such a response, someone in custody
would probably be intimidated into silence concerning the right to
counsel.

The accused has no burden to be articulate.

State v.

Wright, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268 (N.J. 1984); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d
1173 (Alaska App. 1985).

The clarification approach with its

pragmatism burdens the officer to find out the accused's actual
desire.

A nonsequitor such as reciting the Miranda warnings does

not meet this burden.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the equivocal statement
preceded the Miranda warning.

Respondent is correct that Officer

Christiansen's testimony at trial shows the factual sequence to be
statement first, warnings second (R. 123 at 59). However, Officer
Hutchison's testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that the
opposite happened (R. 122 at 4-5). Detective Hutchison further
indicates that no clarification took place:
Q. Did you ask the attorney that might have been
appointed to him when he appeared in court,
[whether he] might be present before he answered
any further questions?
A.

No.
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(R. 122 at 7). Detective Christiansen claimed Mr. Christofferson
indicated he would talk to me at that time without
an attorney present.
(R. 123 at 59). However, there is no record of how
Mr. Christofferson indicated this or if this was just the
detective's subjective belief.
The State admits that the record is sparse (Br. of Res.
at 16). It is also unclear as to the order of events and statements
actually made.

However, the one thing that is clear is that

Mr. Christofferson made a statement concerning his attorney.
need prove nothing more than that.

He

The State has the burden of

proof on waiver of constitutional rights, and the sparse unclear
record should not work in favor of the waiver of those rights. The
inadequate record should not be held against the Defendant in this
case.

D. MR. CHRISTOFFERSONfS STATEMENT THAT HE THOUGHT
COUNSEL MAY HAVE BEEN APPOINTED WAS AT LEAST AN
EQUIVOCAL INVOCATION OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL
PRESENT.
(Reply to Respondent's Point ID)
Respondent relies on two cases to show that
Mr. Christofferson's statement was not even an equivocal request for
counsel.

However, the cases differ factually from the present case.
In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), the

accused made it clear that he would talk to the officers but needed
an attorney present before he would sign any written statement.
at 525.

Barrett argued that an invocation for one purpose is an
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Id.

invocation for all purposes.

Id. at 527. Mr. Christofferson made

no clear statement as to his intentions.

His statement was

ambiguous and its meaning in the circumstances was unclear.
Barrett's command to not disregard the ordinary meaning of such
statements does not apply to this case.
intention stated.

There was no clear

Br. of Res. at 18.

In Quadrini v. Clausen, 864 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1989), the
reviewing courts found that the accused
unequivocally and in clear and unambiguous terms
stated that he did not want an attorney present.
Id. at 582-83.

Quadrini is a waiver case; the notion that any

equivocal statement was made was rejected.

Id. at 583 n.7. This

was based not on the placing of calling cards on the table but on
his clear and repeated waiver of his rights.

Id.

Mr. Christofferson made an equivocal statement.

He made

no repeated and unequivocal statement as to the waiver of his right
to counsel.

Mr. Christofferson stands by the equivocal invocation

analysis contained in his opening brief and cases therein.
Point IAii.)

(See

The Quadrini analysis does not apply to the present

case.

POINT II. A DISCOVERY VIOLATION OCCURRED THAT WAS
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. CHRISTOFFERSON.
(Reply to Respondent's Point II)
As outlined in Point II of Mr. Christofferson1s opening
brief, the police officer who had obtained an incriminating
statement from Mr. Christofferson had an additional contact with the
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D e f e nd a n t

r!: 1 :i s c o i 11 a • ::: t w a s , o f c o \ 11: s e , a 1 s o k n o w n t o

Mr, Christofferson, but the officer's characterization of the
encounter was not known * - r-"
this encounter until th- -..^

The prosecutor did not learn of
.• -

. ,

A] t .1: lougl 1 suet i

information had been requested in discovery by Mr, Christofferson,
informal n mm nf I his undocumented encounter was not provided to
counsel for the Defendant.

A.

(See Appellant's Opening Brief: ,)

DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IIA)

"]," I" i e 1.1 j a 1

i u d * j t- ij e j J I e d 1 1 ir

Christoffer s o i I f s m o t i o n t o

dismiss because the information was not known to the prosecutor or
contained in any investigative report (R. 123 at 78-79).

This is

immaterial, however.
At the outset we stress that we are concerned with
more than the prosecutor's knowledge . . .
Information known to police officers working on
the case is charged to the prosecution since
officers are part of the prosecution team
(citations omitted).
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984).

Shabata holds that

the prosecutor need not know the undisclosed information.
by its facts she
investigative report.

Shabata

the material need not be contained in an
Id. at 787.

This analysis is only just;

otherwise, officers could conveniently fail to record any
information that they di d i Iot wi si I t : ha /e di sc1osed to t he
defendant.

The judge's ruling was clearly erroneouos and should be

overruled by thi s Co\ irt.
The Respondent claims that Mr. Christofferson waived this
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claim of error when he failed to ask for more appropriate relief
than a dismissal.

Respondent cites State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d

879, 882-83 (Utah 1988).

In Griffiths, the defendant became aware

of the previously undisclosed information prior to the day of
trial.

No continuance was requested, which would have been an

appropriate and less burdensome remedy.

Rather, the defendant asked

for a mistrial.
In the present case, Mr. Christofferson did not have the
luxury of such foreknowledge.

An objection to the testimony, while

not inappropriate, might have been ineffective, since the jury would
have heard the information any way.

Striking the testimony would

not necessarily cure the problem, either.

Asking for a continuance

after the information came in would be completely ineffective
because the trial strategy had been chosen and revealed to the jury
in opening arguments.

However, even if any of the choices might

have been effective, this Court should not second guess defense
counsel's trial strategy, especially in a situation like this one in
which the information was made available midtrial in front of the
jury.
Trial counsel vigorously cross-examined the officer and
then, out of the presence of the jury, asked for a dismissal.
Perhaps he could have asked for the information to be stricken.
Yet, he chose not to draw more attention to the problem and to
object out of the presence of the jury.
have been a less burdensome remedy.

Perhaps a mistrial would

However, Griffiths does not

command that defense counsel ask for the most appropriate or least
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biirdensome r< *medy.

Gritr ltn.

' " •*:s that waiver occurs w r -- -.

-;. rial

notice of undisclosed information is gained and counsel cot;., r othing
to remedy the situation until trial.
Here, the ir 1 forn i.a11oi 1 cai ne tc 11 ie a11entioi i of counse 1
while j witness was on the stand.
limited a!., I his point.
was requested.

Counsel's options were severely

An appropriate objection was made and relief

Waiver should not be found under U :ie present facts.

B. THE DISCOVERY .
-~= fT *- .rF " : " E TO
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
(Reply to Respondent's Point IIB)
Respondent's analysis under the facts of this case misses
an important point.
The undisclosed conflicting statement to Detective
C h r i st. i r»nr=iHri !>•; Itself creates a credibility problem.
Mr. Christofferson 1 s story is that he told the police the same thing
throughout the case.
v

Detective Christiansen f s testimony conflicts
" - c 1 — : :,:L-* in the jurors 1 minds as to

-

Mr. Christofferson 1 s credibility.

It is the earlier statement to

Detective Christiansen that forms the bulk of the evidence against
Mr. Christofferson.

This is the pivotal point o£ t ;! Ie case.

ItI closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the case
was a matter of deciding who "is telling you the truth 11 (R. 124 at
i n 'i

Tn a

• -

onsider Mr. Christof f erson 1 s

credibility, the prosecutor only pointed to the discrepancies in the
Defendar

statements to Detective Christiansen (R. 124 at 1 3 - 1 4 ) .

Finally, the prosecutor pointed to the instruction on credibility
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(R. 124 at 14). In rebuttal, the first thing the prosecutor
reemphasized was the allegedly variable stories told to Detective
Christiansen (R. 124 at 26).
The inconsistent statements allegedly made to the victim
are of a different nature.
case.

First, this is not the crux of the

Neither side spends much time arguing this discrepancy.

The

jury is less likely to be swayed by this sort of infighting between
two ex-friends, who are now defendant and victim.

In argument,

Mr. Christofferson's counsel points out that "this is a strange
relationship" (R. 124 at 21). From the testimony of both parties,
it is clear that they have related to each other in a way that is
unusual when weighed against the ordinary course of relationships.
They are employer-employee, landlord-tenant, and friends with a
vague system of paying each other for services.

The jury was not

likely to be troubled by these two men arguing over what they had
told each other.
The Respondent's analysis under prong two is also
flawed.

The State argues that there is substantial evidence to

convict even without the conflicting statement.
correct statement of the harmless error standard.

This is not a
A decision to

reverse and remand must be based on the determination
that absent the erroneous admission . . . , there
was a reasonable likelihood that [the Defendant]
might have obtained a more favorable result at
trial, . . .
State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1989).

Even if

there is substantial evidence to support the conviction absent the
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improperly introduced evidence, the conviction should be set aside.
The reasonable likelihood question is not just the
substantial evidence test in disguise; rather, it
focuses on the taint caused by the error. If the
taint it sufficient, it is irrelevant that there
is sufficient untainted evidence to support a
verdict. Any stricter interpretation of harmful
error . , , runs the risk of substituting our
judgment for that of the jury and could be
criticized as encouraging the improper admission
of evidence by de facto weakening the sanctions
against it.

Id

Mr

Christofferson has the right to a trial free from the

d i f f :i c i 11 t :i e, 3 :i 1 n j: »o s e :i lb} t h e 1! a t e d I s c 1 o s 1 11: e o f t h I s e v i d e n c e

CONCLUSION
For uii; ijinl .ill ot
Mi:

t ho foregoing reasons,

Christof ferson requests this Court to reverse the conviction and

the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress with an order to
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges or provide for a new
trial without such evidence.

.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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